2005: Office of Defense Trade Controls

NOTICES PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER DURING 2005
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OFFICE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS
(22 CFR Part 120 et seq.)

NOTE: CHANGES TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS LISTED BELOW ARE NUMBERED CONSECUTIVELY, BEGINNING IN JANUARY OF THE NEW YEAR.

 

  1. Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Nine Foreign Entities, Including a Ban on S. Government Procurement, and Removal of Penalties From One Entity (70 FR 133 on January 3, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State has designated that nine entities have engaged in activities that require the imposition of measures pursuant to Section 3 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, which provides for penalties on entities for the transfer to Iran since January 1, 1999, of equipment and technology controlled under multilateral export control lists (Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement) or otherwise having the potential to make a material contribution to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cruise or ballistic missile systems. The latter category includes (a) items of the same kind as those on multilateral lists, but falling below the control list parameters, when it is determined that such items have the potential of making a material contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems, (b) other items with the potential of making such a material contribution, when added through case-by-case decisions, and (c) items on U.S. national control lists for WMD/missile reasons that are not on multilateral lists.

The following foreign entities are identified in the report submitted pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Act: Beijing Alite Technologies Company Limited (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; China Aero-Technology Import Export Corporation (CATIC) (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; China Great Wall Industry Corporation (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; China North Industry Corporation (NORINCO) (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; Ecoma Enterprise Co. Ltd. (Taiwan) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; Paeksan Associated Corporation (North Korea) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; Q.C. Chen (China); Wha Cheong Tai Company (aka Wah Cheong Tai Company and Hua change Tai Company) (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; and Zibo Chemet Equipment Corporation Ltd. (aka Chemet Global Ltd. (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof.

In addition, it was determined on December 20, 2004 that the sanctions imposed effective September 23, 2004 (69 FR 4845), on the Spanish entity Telstar (and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof), no longer apply.

 

  1. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs: Directorate of Defense Trade Controls; Notifications to the Congress of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses (70 FR 3574 on January 25, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State has published a Notification of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses to Congress that exceeds the $25,000,000 Congressional Notification threshold for exports to Greece. The Department of State has also published a Notification of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses to Congress that exceeds the $50,000,000 Congressional Notification thresholds for exports to Bolivia, Colombia, France, Greece, India, and Mexico. The Department of State has also published Notification of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses to Congress that exceeds $1,000,000 to Colombia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. The Department of State has published a Notification of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses to Congress that exceeds the $100,000,000 Congressional Notification thresholds for exports to Canada, Italy, Japan and Russia. The Department of State has also published notifications of proposed manufacturing license agreements for the manufacture of significant military equipment abroad to Italy and Poland.

 

  1. Foreign Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations (70 FR 4185 on January 28, 2005)

Commentary: In the matter of the revocation of Kahane.net as an alias of Kahane Chai, also known as Kach, also known as Kahane Lives, also known as the Kfar Tapuah Fund, also known as The Judean Voice, also known as The Judean Legion, also known as The Way of the Torah, also known as The Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea, also known as the Repression of Traitors, also known as Dikuy Bogdim, also known as DOV, also known as the State of Judea, also known as the Committee for the Safety of the Roads, also known as the Sword of David, also known as Judea Police, also known as Forefront of the Idea, also known as The Qomemiyut Movement, also known as KOACH, also known as New Kach Movement, also known as newkach.org, also known as Kahane, also known as Yeshivat HaRav Meir, also known as the International Kahane Movement, also known as Kahane.org, also known as Kahanetzadak.com, also known as Kahane Tzadak, also known as the

Hatikva Jewish Identity Center, also known as the Rabbi Meir David Kahane Memorial Fund, also known as Friends of the Jewish Idea Yeshiva, also known as Judean Congress, also known as Jewish Legion, also known as The Voice of Judea, also known as No’ar Meir, also known as Meir’s Youth, also known as American Friends of Yeshivat Rav Meir, also known as American Friends of the United Yeshiva Movement, also known as The Committee Against Racism and Discrimination (CARD), a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

In consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State revoked the designation of Kahane.net as an alias of Kahane Chai, also known as Kach, Kahane.org, and the other aliases listed above, pursuant to section 219 of the INA, based on a finding that circumstances have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation. This revocation is effective on the date of publication of this notice. In all other respects, the redesignation on October 2, 2003 of Kahane Chai, also known as Kach, Kahane.org, and the other aliases listed above is maintained.

 

  1. Documentation of Nonimmigrants Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended-Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) (70 FR 7853 on February 16, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State has published a rule making final the interim rule amending the Department’s regulations pertaining to foreign students and exchange visitors who enter the United States in F, M or J nonimmigrant visa categories. The new regulations will establish the verification and reporting procedures required by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) foreign student monitoring system known as Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). As SEVIS was fully implemented on February 15, 2003, the Department’s transitional foreign student database known as the Interim Student and Exchange Authentication System (ISEAS) is no longer available to the educational and exchange visitor communities. However, it remains available to consular sections in the field as a means of electronically verifying student and exchange visitor documentation issued prior to February 15, 2003.

 

  1. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs: Directorate of Defense Trade Controls; Notifications to the Congress of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses (70 FR 8650 on February 22, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State has published a Notification of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses to Congress that exceeds the $1,000,000 Congressional Notification threshold for exports to the Philippines and Canada. The Department of State has also published a Notification of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses to Congress that exceeds the $50,000,000 Congressional Notification thresholds for exports to Israel, Kazakhstan and Brazil. The Department of State has published a Notification of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses to Congress that exceeds the $100,000,000 Congressional Notification thresholds for exports to Japan, Mexico, Norway and Kazakhstan.

 

  1. Bureau of Nonproliferation; Extension of Waiver of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Chinese Government Activities (70 FR 14491 on March 22, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State has published a notice that a determination has been made to extend the waiver of import sanctions against certain activities of the Chinese Government that was announced on September 19, 2003, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”), as amended. On March 17, 2005, a determination was made pursuant to Section 73(e) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2797b(e)) that is essential to the national security of the United States to extend the waiver period for an additional six months, effective from the date of expiration of the previous waiver (March 18, 2005).

 

  1. Determination Pursuant to Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224 Relating to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT, LeT), aka Lashkar-e-Toiba, aka Lashkar-i-Taiba, aka al Mansoorian, aka al Mansooreen, aka Army of the Pure, aka Army of the Righteous, aka Army of the Pure and Righteous (70 FR 20412 on April 19, 2005)

Commentary: Acting under the authority of Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended, and in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of homeland Security, the Secretary of State has determined that Lashkar-e-Tayyiba uses or has used the following aliases in addition to those listed above: Paasban-e-Kashmir, Paasban-i-Ahle-Hadith, Pasban-e-Kashmir, Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith, and Paasban-e-Ahle-Hadis. The Secretary of State has amended the designation of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (and its aliases) to add the following names as aliases together with any transliterations of these names: Paasban-e-Kashmir, Paasban-i-Ahle-Hadith, Pasban-e-Kashmir, Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith, and Paasban-e-Ahle-Hadis.

 

  1. Determination and Certification Under Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (70 FR 28979 on May 19, 2005)

Commentary: Pursuant to Section 40A of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2781), and Executive Order 11958, as amended, the Secretary of State has determined and certified to the Congress that the following countries are not cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts: Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea and Syria. The Secretary of States has also stated that the decision to retain Libya on the list of countries not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts comes in the context of on-going and comprehensive review of Libya’s record of support for terrorism. Although this process is not complete, Libya has taken significant steps to repudiate its past support for terrorism. When the Department of State’s review of Libya’s overall record is complete, they will consult with the Congress further.

 

  1. Foreign Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations; Designation: Islamic Jihad Group (70 FR 30179 on May 25, 2005)

Commentary: Determination pursuant to Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224 relating to the designation of Islamic Jihad Group, also known as Jama’at al-Jihad, also known as the Libyan Society, also known as the Kazakh Jama’at, also known as the Jamaat Mojahedin, also known as the Jamiyat, also known as Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami, also known as Dzhamaat Modzhakhedov, also known as Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan, also known as al-Djihad al-Islami. The Secretary of State has determined that the above-named has committed and poses a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals and the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.

 

  1. Amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Various (70 FR 34652 on June 15, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State amended and/or clarified the content of a number of provisions of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”). The affected parts of the ITAR are Part 120 — Purpose and Definitions; Part 123 — Licenses for the Export of Defense Articles; Part 124 — Agreements, Off-Shore Procurement and Other Defense Services; Part 126 — General Policies and Provisions; and Part 127 — Violations and Penalties. Most are minor in nature, though the notable changes are detailed below.

Section 22 CFR 123.15 was revised, pursuant to Public Law 107-228, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, to adjust the threshold amounts for Congressional notice in the following manner: (1) The threshold levels for member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”), or Australia, Japan or New Zealand are established at $25 million for the export of major defense equipment sold under a contract and $100 million for the export of defense articles and defense services sold under contract; and (2) a threshold level of $1 million is established for proposed exports to all countries involving firearms controlled under Category I of the USML.

Section 22 CFR 126.5 has been amended to clarify for exporters the range of defense articles, related technical data, and defense services that will continue to require a license issued by the DDTC for export to or temporary import from Canada. The lists of items excluded from the provisions of Section 126.5 are outlined in paragraph (b).

Finally, Section 22 CFR 127.12 is amended to revise the address to which persons, firms, or organizations send voluntary disclosures of violations of the AECA. Disclosures should be sent to the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. Exporters should consult the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls Web site at http://www.pmdtc.org for the appropriate street address.

 

  1. In the Matter of the Designation of the Islamic Jihad Group, aka the Jama’at al-Jihad, aka the Libyan Society, aka the Kazakh Jama’at, aka the Jamaat Mojahedin, aka Jamiyat, aka Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami, aka Dzhamaat Modzhakhedov, aka Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan, aka al-Djihad al-Islami (Including any and All Transliterations of Its Name) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization Pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended (70 FR 35332 on June 17, 2005)

Commentary: The Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State has concluded that there is a sufficient factual basis to find that the relevant circumstances described in Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), as amended (U.S.C. Section 1189), exist with respect to the above-named organization. Thereby, effective June 17, 2005, the Secretary of State designates the above organization as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to Section 219 of the INA.

 

  1. In the Matter of the Amended Designation of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT, LeT), aka Lashkar-e-Toiba, aka Lashkar-i-Taiba, aka al Mansoorian, aka al Mansooreen, aka Army of the Pure, aka Army of the Righteous, aka Army of the Pure and Righteous as a Foreign Terrorist Organization Pursuant to Section 219(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (70 FR 35333 on June 17, 2005)

Commentary: The Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State has concluded that there is a sufficient factual basis to find that the above-named uses or has used additional aliases. Thereby, effective June 17, 2005, the Secretary of State amends the 2003 redesignation of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to Section 219(b) of the INA) (U.S.C. 1189(b)), to include the following transliterations thereof: Paasban-e-Kashmir, Paasban-i-Ahle Hadith, Pasban-e-Kashmir, Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith, Paasban-e-Ahle Hadis.

 

  1. Debarment Involving Hughes Network Systems (Beijing) Co. Ltd. (70 FR 35333 on June 17, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State has published a notice regarding imposed administrative debarment against Hughes Network Systems (Beijing) Co. Ltd. pursuant to a January 26, 2005 Consent Agreement which debarred HNS (China) until May 14, 2005 and other authority based upon Section 127.7(a) and (b)(2) of the ITAR (22 CFR Sections 120 to 130).

Reinstatement after May 14, 2005 is not automatic, but is contingent on full compliance with the terms of the January 26, 2005 Consent Agreement and evidence that the underlying problems that gave rise to the violations have been addressed. At the end of the debarment period, licensing privileges may be reinstated only at the request of the debarred person following the necessary Departmental review. Until licensing privileges are reinstated, HNS China will remain debarred.

This notice is provided in order to make the public aware that the persons listed above are prohibited from participating directly or indirectly in any brokering activities and in any export from or temporary import into the United States of defense articles, related technical data, or defense services in all situations covered by the ITAR. Exception may be made to this denial policy on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. However, such an exception would be granted only after a full review of all circumstances.

 

  1. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs: Directorate of Defense Trade Controls; Notifications to the Congress of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses (70 FR 39352 on July 7, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State has published a Notification of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses to Congress that exceeds the $50,000,000 Congressional Notification thresholds for exports to Kazakhstan and Russia. The Department of State has published a Notification of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses to Congress that exceeds the $100,000,000 Congressional Notification thresholds for exports to Australia, Iraq, Japan, and New Zealand. The Department of State has also published a notification of a proposed manufacturing licensing agreement for the manufacture of significant military equipment abroad with Australia.

 

  1. Amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Part 126 (70 FR 39919 on July 12, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State has published a final rule amending and/or clarifying the content of Part 126 of the ITAR. Specifically, two changes to the ITAR were made. The first change affects 22 CFR 126.5, which described inter alia the modalities by which exports, without a license issued by the DDTC, may conduct permanent and temporary exports of defense articles to Canada, and temporary imports from Canada. The list of items excluded from the provisions of 22 CFR 126.5 are amended in the following ways: the text of 126.5(b)(12) is amended to reflect textual revisions to Category XIV of the U.S. Munitions List regarding Chemical and biological agents. The body of chemical agents encompassed by 126.5(b)(12) and previously controlled in a single paragraph of the Category now has been grouped by type and distributed into several distinct paragraphs. The text also clarifies but does not change the scope of biological agents controlled. Other changes are made to reflect the redesignation of paragraphs in the Category.

The second change is a result of the statutory direction. A new section of the ITAR implements Section 1225 of Public Law 108-375 regarding “Bilateral Exchanges and Trade in Defense Articles and Defense Services between the United States and the United Kingdom and Australia.” This section, to be designated 126.15, calls for the expeditious processing of license applications for the export of defense articles and services to Australia or the United Kingdom, consistent with national security and the requirements of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)

 

  1. Statutory Debarment Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (70 FR 46258 on August 9, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State has published a notice imposing a statutory debarment pursuant to Section 127.7(c) of the ITAR (22 CFR Parts 120 to 130) on persons convicted of violating or conspiring to violate Section 38 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2778). Pursuant to Section 38 of the AECA and Section 127.7 of the ITAR, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs has statutorily debarred the following persons for a period of three years following the date of their AECA conviction:

(1) Mexpar International, Inc. a/k/a “Pasadena Aerospace” and “Aviation Logistics and Supply,” July 30, 2004, U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Los Angeles), Case: 03-CR-170-ALL.

(2) Ahmad Nahardani a/k/a “Alex Nahardani,” August 9, 2004, U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Los Angeles), Case: 03-170-AHM.

(3) Gabriela de Brea a/k/a “Gabriela Brea” and “Gabriela Lopez-Sosa,” September 10, 2004, U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Los Angeles), Case : 03-170-AHM.

As noted above, at the end of the three-year period, the above named persons/entities remain debarred unless licensing privileges are reinstated. Debarred persons are generally ineligible to participate in activity regulated under the ITAR (see e.g., sections 120.1(c) and (d), and 127.11(a)). The Department of State will not consider applications for licenses or requests for approvals that involve any person who has been convicted of violating or of conspiring to violate the AECA during the period of statutory debarment.

 

  1. Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Section 126.1(i) (70 FR 50966 on August 29, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State has published a final rule amending the ITAR by modifying the denial policy regarding the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) at 22 CFR 126.1. This action is taken in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution (“UNSCR”) 1596, unanimously adopted on April 18, 2005, which imposed a nation-wide embargo on arms sales or transfers to any recipient in the DRC. It represents an expansion of the policy issued under UNSCR 1493, which on July 28, 2003, imposed an embargo on the sale of arms, related materials, and defense service in the provinces of North and South Kivu and the Ituri District in the DRC.

 

  1. Amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Port Directors Definition, NATO Definition, Major Non-NATO Ally Definition, Recordkeeping Requirements, Supporting Documentation for Electronic License Application, Disclosure of Registration Documents (70 FR 50958 on August 29, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State has published a final rule amending various sections of the ITAR. Two new definitions were added: (1) a definition for the “North Atlantic Treaty Organization” and its member countries is added at 22 CFR 120.31; and (2) a new definition for “major non-NATO ally” and applicable countries is included at 22 CFR 120.32. Also, the rule states that Taiwan shall be treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally. The rule also adds Morocco and Pakistan to the list of major non-NATO allies of the United States.

In addition, Section 122.3 has been amended to require a registrant renewing its registration to submit the renewal request at least 30 days prior to the expiration date.    Section 122.5 has been amended to require that if maintaining records in an electronic format the information must be capable of being reproduced legibly on paper. Also, the stored information, if altered, must keep track of all changes, who made them and when they were made. Section 123.1 has been revised to address if submitting fully electronic license applications that there is no need for multiple copies of supporting documentation. Section 126.10 regarding disclosure of information has been amended to include that registration documents may not generally be disclosed to the public under Section 38(e) of the AECA.

Finally, Section 127.4 has been revised to address the authority of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers. Certain references to the “Office of Defense Trade Controls” were changed to the “Directorate of Defense Trade Controls” (Sections 122.5, 123.1, 123.4, 123.5, 123.16, 126.4, 126.5, 126.6 and 126.13).

 

  1. Termination of Statutory Debarment and Reinstatement of Eligibility To Apply for Export/Retransfer Authorizations Pursuant to Section 38(g)(4) of the Arms Export Control Act for Orbit/FR, Inc. (70 FR 53267 on September 7, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State has published a notice terminating the statutory debarment against Orbit/FR, Inc. pursuant to Section 38(g)(4) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2778) and § 127.11 of the ITAR (22 CFR Parts 120-130). After a thorough review, the State Department found that Orbit/FR has taken the necessary steps to address law enforcement concerns; including entering a Consent Agreement with the Department of State whereby Orbit/FR will pay civil penalties in cash and remedial compliances measures. As a result, the debarment against Orbit/FR has been rescinded effective August 29, 2005. The effect of this termination is that Orbit/FR and its affiliates may participate without prejudice in the export of defense articles and defense services subject to certain provisions of the AECA, the ITAR and the Consent Agreement.

 

  1. Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Extension of Waiver of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Chinese Government Activities (70 FR 56205 on September 26, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State determined on March 17, 2005, pursuant to Section 73(e) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2797(b)(e)) that is was essential to the national security of the United States to waive for a period of six months the import sanction described in Section 74(a)(2)(C) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)(2)(C)) against the activities of the Chinese Government, i.e., activities of the Chinese government relating to the development or production of any missile equipment or technology and activities of the Chinese government affecting the development or production of electronics, space systems or equipment and military aircraft (see Federal Register Vol. 68, No. 183, Friday September 19, 2003). This action was effective on March 18, 2005.

On September 14, 2005, a determination was made that is essential to the national security of the United States to extend the waiver period for an additional six months, effective from the date of expiration of the previous waiver, September 19, 2005.

 

  1. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Statutory Debarment Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (70 FR 57349 on September 30, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State has published a notice imposing statutory debarment on persons convicted of violating or conspiring to violate Section 28 of the AECA. Pursuant to Section 38 of the AECA and Section 127.7 of the ITAR, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs has statutorily debarred the following persons for a period of three years following the date of their AECA conviction, (1) Equipment & Supply, Inc., August 6, 2004, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin (Milwaukee), Case 02-Cr-262; (2) Klaus Ernst Buhler, June 21, 2003, U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida (Jacksonville), Case : 3:02-Cr-13-J-12TEM; (3) Rotair Industries, Inc., July 29, 2004, U.S. District Court, District of Connecticut (New Haven), Case : 3:04Cr 149 JBA.

As noted above, at the end of the three-year period, the above named persons/entities remain debarred unless licensing privileges are reinstated. Debarred persons are generally ineligible to participate in activity regulated under the ITAR (see e.g., Sections 120.1(c) and (d), and 127.11(a)). The Department of State will not consider applications for licenses or requests for approvals that involve any person who has been convicted of violating or of conspiring to violate the AECA during the period of statutory debarment.

 

  1. In the Matter of the Designation of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, aka Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM), as a Foreign Terrorist Organization Pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (70 FR 59114 on October 11, 2005)

Commentary: The Secretary of State has concluded that there is a sufficient factual basis to find that the relevant circumstances described in Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1189, “INA”), exist with respect to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, aka Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (“GICM”). Therefore, effective October 11, 2005, the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, aka Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM) is designated as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to Section 219(a) of the INA.

 

  1. Determination Under Section 564 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Public Law 103-236, as Amended; Suspending Prohibitions on Certain Sales and Leases Under the Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 (70 FR 60127 on October 14, 2005)

Commentary: The Secretary of State has determined that suspending the application of Section 564(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act to Iraq and extending the suspension of the application of Section 564(a) to the following eight countries until May 1, 2006 will promote the objectives of Section 564: Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

 

  1. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs: Directorate of Defense Trade Controls; Notifications to the Congress of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses (70 FR 69374 on November 15, 2005)

Commentary: The Department of State has published a Notification of Proposed Commercial Export License to Congress that exceeds the $14,000,000 Congressional Notification threshold for an export to South Korea. The Department of States has also published Notification of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses to Congress that exceeds the $1,000,000 Congressional Notification threshold for exports to the Belgium, Ghana, Haiti, and Japan. The Department of State has also published Notification of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses to Congress that exceeds the $50,000,000 Congressional Notification thresholds for exports to Iraq, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Norway, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine. The Department of State has published Notification of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses to Congress that exceeds the $100,000,000 Congressional Notification thresholds for exports to Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The Department of State has also published Notification of Proposed Manufacturing License Agreements for the manufacturing of significant military equipment abroad with Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom.

 

  1. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Statutory Debarment Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations(70 FR 69620 on November 16, 2005)

Commentary: The Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, has published a notice that the Department of State has imposed statutory debarment pursuant to Section 127.7(c) of the ITAR (22 CFR Parts 120 to 130) on persons convicted of violating or conspiring to violate Section 38 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2778).

The following persons are statutorily debarred for a period of three years following the date of their AECA conviction:

(1) Guillermo Cardoso-Arias, April 1, 2005, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida (Ft. Lauderdale), Case: 0:04CR60262-COHN;

(2) Davilyn, Inc., June 27, 2005, U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Los Angeles), Case: CR 05-00432-RMT;

(3) Carlos Gamarra-Murillo, August 9, 2005, U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida (Tampa), Case: 8:04-CR-349-T-27EAJ;

(4) Xiuwen Liang also known as (a.k.a.) Jennifer Liang and Jennifer Zhuang, April 14, 2005, U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Los Angeles), Case: CR03-138-SVW;

(5) Jinghua Zhuang a.k.a. Jackey Zhuang, January 6, 2004, U.S. District Court, Central District of California (Los Angeles), Case: CR03-138-SVW.

At the end of the three-year period, the above named persons/entities remain debarred unless licensing privileges are reinstated.

Debarred persons are generally ineligible to participate in activity regulated under the ITAR (see e.g., Sections 120.1(c) and (d), and 127.11(a)). The Department of State will not consider applications for licenses or requests for approvals that involve any person who has been convicted of violating or of conspiring to violate the AECA during the period of statutory debarment. Persons who have been statutorily debarred may appeal to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security for reconsideration of the ineligibility determination. A request for reconsideration must be submitted in writing within 30 days after a person has been informed of the adverse decision, in accordance with 22 CFR 127.7(d) and 128.13(a).

 

  1. Determination Pursuant to Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224 Relating to the Designation of Sajid Mohammed Badat, Also Known as Saajid Badat, Also Known as Muhammed Badat, Also Known as Sajid Muhammad Badat, Also Known as Saajid Mohammad Badet, Also Known as Muhammed Badet, Also Known as Sajid Muhammad Badet, Also Known as Abu Issa al Pakistani, Also Known as Issa, Also Known as Issa Al Britaini, Also Known as Issa Al Pakistani; DOB: 28 March 1979; Alt. DOB: 8 March 1976; POB: Pakistan; Citizenship: British; Passport: 703114075 and 026725401 (70 FR 75233 on December 19, 2005)

Commentary: Acting under the authority of Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended by Executive Order 13286 of July 2, 2002, and Executive Order 13284 of January 23, 2003, and Executive Order 13372 of February 16, 2005, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State determined that Sajid Mohammed Badat, aka Saajid Badat, aka Muhammed Badat, aka Sajid Muhammad Badat, aka Saajid Mohammad Badet, aka Muhammed Badet, aka Sajid Muhammad Badet, aka Abu Issa Al Pakistani, aka Issa, aka Issa Al Britaini, aka Issa Al Pakistani has committed and poses a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals and the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.

 

  1. Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Entities, Including a Ban on S. Government Procurement, and Removal of Penalties From One Entity (70 FR 77441 on December 30, 2005)

Commentary: A determination has been made that nine entities have engaged in activities that require the imposition of measures pursuant to Section 3 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, which provides for penalties on entities for the transfer to Iran since January 1, 1999, of equipment and technology controlled under multilateral export control lists (Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement) or otherwise having the potential to make a material contribution to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cruise or ballistic missile systems. The latter category includes (a) items of the same kind as those on multilateral lists, but falling below the control list parameters, when it is determined that such items have the potential of making a material contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems, (b) other items with the potential of making such a material contribution, when added through case-by-case decisions, and (c) items on U.S. national control lists for WMD/missile reasons that are not on multilateral lists.

The nine entities that have engaged in activities that require the imposition of measures include China Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; Hongdu Aviation Industry Group (HAIG) (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; LIMMT Metallurgy and Minerals Company Ltd. (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; Ounion (Asia) International Economic and Technical Cooperation Ltd.; (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; Sabero Organic Chemicals Gujarat Ltd. (India) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; Sandhya Organic Chemicals PVT Ltd. (India) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; Steyr-Manlicher Gmbh (Austria) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof; and Zibo Chemet Equipment Company (China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof.

Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of the Act, the following measures are imposed on these entities:

No department or agency of the United States Government may procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement of, any goods, technology or services from these foreign persons;

No department or agency of the United States Government may provide any assistance to the foreign persons, and these persons shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance program of the United States Government;

No United States Government sales to the foreign persons of any item on the United States Munitions List (as in effect on August 8, 1995) are permitted, and all sales to these persons of any defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act are terminated; and,

No new individual licenses shall be granted for the transfer to these foreign persons of items the export of which is controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or the Export Administration Regulations, and any existing such licenses are suspended.

These measures shall be implemented by the responsible departments and agencies of the United States Government and will remain in place for two years from the effective date, except to the extent that the Secretary of State or Deputy Secretary of State may subsequently determine otherwise. A new determination will be made in the event that circumstances change in such a manner as to warrant a change in the duration of sanctions.

It was also determined that sanctions imposed on an Indian entity, Dr. C. Surendar, effective September 23, 2004 (69 FR 4895) are rescinded.